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Local Government Law
by Russell A. Britt, * Kelsey L. Kicklighter, ** Jennifer D.
Herzog, *** Nick Kinsley, **** Jacob Stalvey O'Neal, *****
Pearson K. Cunningham, ****** and Philip E. Friduss *******
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Interesting developments on the application of sovereign immunity
continued during this survey period. 1 In City of College Park v. Clayton
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County, 2 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed whether sovereign
immunity 3 bars suits between political subdivisions of the state, such as
counties and cities, and concluded that it does not. 4 The case involved
taxation of alcoholic beverages at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport. The airport is located primarily within Clayton
County, while some of the businesses located within the airport are
located in unincorporated sections of the county and other businesses are
located within the incorporated limits of the City of College Park. The
city sued the county, asserting that the city had not been receiving the
proper amount of alcoholic beverage taxes to which it was entitled under
state law and that the county improperly infringed on the city’s authority
to tax by instructing vendors to remit 50% of the taxes due from the sale
of alcohol in those portions of the airport located within the city’s limits. 5
While involving several legal issues, the supreme court noted that the
issue of whether sovereign immunity applied was the most important
issue to consider. 6 Following a lengthy discussion on the continuous state
constitutional reservation of the common law of sovereign immunity and
the origins of the same, the supreme court recapped that the State of
Georgia is the sovereign for purposes of this immunity and that the
sovereign cannot be called into the courts of its own making by private
persons without the sovereign’s permission. 7 This understanding
provided a strong indication that sovereign immunity does not apply
where two political subdivisions of the state are exercising their
respective home rule powers by collecting tax revenues and neither is
acting on behalf of the state because, in such scenario, there is no
sovereignty to protect. 8 In other words, the county is not a sovereign over
the city and vice versa, and “neither entity retains superior authority
over the other that would prevent it from being hailed into a court of law
by the other.” 9
The supreme court, therefore, held that sovereign immunity would not
apply to this lawsuit unless applicable precedent somehow altered this
306 Ga. 301, 830 S.E.2d 179 (2019).
The Georgia Constitution provides:
[S]overeign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and
agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies
can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides
that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.
Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, para. 9(e).
4 City of College Park, 306 Ga. at 313, 830 S.E.2d at 187.
5 Id. at 301–02, 830 S.E.2d at 180–81.
6 Id. at 304, 830 S.E.2d at 182.
7 Id. at 310–11, 830 S.E.2d at 186.
8 Id. at 311, 830 S.E.2d at 186.
9 Id.
2
3
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fundamental nature of sovereign immunity. 10 Nevertheless, a review of
case law revealed that political subdivisions had been allowed to sue each
other under common law in both England and Georgia, and no precedent
was found where suits between political subdivisions of a sovereign were
barred by sovereign immunity. 11 Accordingly, the supreme court held
sovereign immunity did not bar the city from bringing suit against the
county in this case. 12
In Klingensmith v. Long County, 13 the Georgia Court of Appeals
provided an important reminder on how sovereign immunity is applied
differently to cities versus counties. 14 The plaintiffs sued Long County,
alleging negligence and nuisance for repeated flooding of their
subdivision. They argued that their negligence claim was not barred by
sovereign immunity because the county somehow could be held
vicariously liable for ministerial acts negligently performed by the
county’s employees. 15
The court of appeals, nevertheless, reiterated that the law is clear that
a “county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing
an official function only to the extent the county has waived sovereign
immunity.” 16 And it is a plaintiff’s burden to point to the applicable
waiver. 17 Although the plaintiffs contended that a waiver of sovereign
immunity exists for claims alleging the negligent performance of
ministerial duties, the court of appeals correctly found that such waiver
only applies to cities and does not apply to counties. 18 The court of
appeals therefore held that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims were barred
by sovereign immunity. 19
The holding in Board of Commissioners of Lowndes County v. Mayor
of Valdosta, et al. 20 highlights an on-going legal conundrum following the

Id.
Id. at 311–13, 830 S.E.2d at 186–87.
12 Id. at 313, 830 S.E.2d at 188.
13 352 Ga. App. 21, 833 S.E.2d 608 (2019).
14 Id. at 24, 833 S.E.2d at 613.
15 Id. at 22–23, 833 S.E.2d at 612–13.
16 Id. at 24, 833 S.E.2d at 613 (quoting Ratliff v. McDonald, 326 Ga. App. 306, 309, 756
S.E.2d 569, 574 (2014)).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 352 Ga. App. 391, 834 S.E.2d 890 (2019), cert. granted (June 1, 2020). For further
detail on the factual overview of this case, see discussion under Service Delivery Strategies
section, infra.
10
11
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Lathrop v. Deal 21 decision. Arising from a dispute over requirements
under state’s Service Delivery Strategy Act, 22 the county sued the cities
within the county and the Georgia Department of Community Affairs
(DCA), following DCA’s imposition of sanctions on the county and cities
pursuant to the Act. 23 The county requested declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as mandamus relief, arguing that a prior service delivery
strategy agreement between the county and the cities should remain in
effect and that the county and cities should remain eligible for
state-administered financial assistance, grants, loans, and permits. 24
Asserting sovereign immunity, DCA filed a motion to dismiss the
declaratory and injunctive relief claims. In response, the county filed an
amended petition removing DCA as a party and adding the commissioner
and board members of DCA in their official and individual capacities. The
commissioner and board members then filed a motion to dismiss the
amended petition, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief, and the trial court granted it. 25
The Georgia Court of Appeals noted that in Lathrop and other
decisions the Georgia Supreme Court previously held that sovereign
immunity barred claims against the state for declaratory and injunctive
relief. 26 However, in Lathrop the supreme court also “indicated that such
suits against state officers in their individual capacities however may not
be barred by sovereign immunity.” 27 The court of appeals nevertheless
pointed to other language in Lathrop explaining that sovereign immunity
cannot be evaded by suing servants or agents of the state, “when the real
claim is against the [s]tate itself and it is the party vitally interested.” 28
The court of appeals noted that the test for determining whether a suit
is in reality one against the state is whether “if the relief prayed [for] in
the present case is granted, it will not operate to control the action of the
[s]tate or subject it to liability.” 29 Applying this test, the court of appeals
held that (1) the county’s pleadings and briefs demonstrated that DCA
was the real party in interest; (2) the relief requested would control the
actions of the state by requiring the commissioner and board members to
21 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017) (holding sovereign immunity bars declaratory and
injunctive relief claims against the state, including challenges to a law’s constitutionality
under the Georgia Constitution).
22 O.C.G.A. §§ 36-70-1 through 36-70-28 (2020).
23 352 Ga. App. at 392–93, 834 S.E.2d at 892–93.
24 Id. at 393, 834 S.E.2d at 893.
25 Id. at 393–94, 834 S.E.2d at 893.
26 Id. at 394, 834 S.E.2d at 893.
27 Id.
28 Id., 834 S.E.2d at 893–94 (quoting Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 414–15, 801 S.E.2d at 873).
29 Id. at 395, 834 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 37, 55 S.E.2d
711, 719 (1949)).
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direct DCA to stop certain actions; and (3) the commissioner and board
members had no statutory authority in their individual capacities under
the Act to direct DCA to do anything. 30 Therefore, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the declaratory and injunctive relief
claims on sovereign immunity grounds. 31
This holding counters, at least in part, the proposition made in
Lathrop that while sovereign immunity bars such claims against the
state and its officials in their official capacities, officials in their
individual capacities nonetheless may be sued for prospective declaratory
and injunctive relief. 32 The supreme court, however, granted certiorari
on June 1, 2020.
In Gatto v. City of Statesboro, 33 the Georgia Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the physical precedent holding in City of Albany v. Stanford 34
that the “nuisance exception” to sovereign immunity does not apply
where the damages at issue are injury to person or loss of life. 35 Sovereign
immunity therefore applied to the plaintiffs’ nuisance claim against the
City of Statesboro for injuries and the alleged wrongful death of their son
following his altercation with a bouncer at a bar in the city. 36
The plaintiffs further argued that the city waived its sovereign
immunity through its purchase of insurance. While the city did have an
insurance policy, the policy contained an endorsement providing that
there was coverage under the policy where sovereign immunity otherwise
would have applied. 37 The court of appeals therefore held that because
the lawsuit involved a governmental function to which sovereign
immunity applies, the insurance policy did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims
due to the plain language of the policy endorsement. 38
The plaintiffs also tried to argue that the policy endorsement
“effectively usurps the [Georgia] General Assembly’s legislative waiver
and allows [cities] to contract around the waiver.” 39 However, the court
of appeals held that the legislative waiver expressly provides for the
waiver only where the policy “covers an occurrence for which the defense
of sovereign immunity is available.” 40 Thus, given the plain meaning of
Id. at 395–96, 834 S.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 396, 834 S.E.2d at 895.
32 See Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 434–35, 801 S.E.2d at 886.
33 353 Ga. App. 178, 834 S.E.2d 623 (2019).
34 347 Ga. App. 95, 99, 815 S.E.2d 322, 326 (2018) (physical precedent), reconsideration
denied (July 17, 2018), cert. denied (Apr. 29, 2019).
35 Gatto, 353 Ga. App. at 183, 834 S.E.2d at 628.
36 Id. at 178, 183, 834 S.E.2d at 625, 628.
37 Id. at 183, 834 S.E.2d at 628.
38 Id. at 184, 834 S.E.2d at 628–29.
39 Id., 834 S.E.2d at 629.
40 Id., 834 S.E.2d at 629 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(a) (2020)).
30
31
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the statute and that “the Supreme Court of Georgia [previously] has
specifically analyzed insurance policies to determine whether they
actually provide coverage for a plaintiff’s claims,” the court of appeals
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument. 41
Finally, in a pair of cases decided by two different panels within nine
days of each other, the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the
waivers from protection provided under the Recreational Property Act, 42
including where there is a charge for the use of recreational property, do
not constitute a waiver of a county’s sovereign immunity. 43
II. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
It was noted in the June 1, 2017 through May 31, 2018 Survey 44 that
the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision in Odum v. Harn 45 did not heed
the Georgia Supreme Court’s discussion in Barnett v. Caldwell, 46 which
admonished lower courts for summarily classifying student supervision
as a discretionary function in the context of official immunity 47 without
analyzing the particular facts of the case 48—likely because Barnett was
decided just ten days prior to Odum. The court of appeals got a second
bite at the apple during this survey period after the supreme court
granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari, vacated the prior Odum
decision, and remanded the case in order for the court of appeals to
reconsider its decision in light of Barnett. 49 The revised analysis,
however, did not change the conclusion and the court of appeals again
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Odum v. Harn. 50

Id., 834 S.E.2d at 629.
O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 through 51-3-26 (2019).
43 See Gwinnett County, Ga. v. Ashby, 354 Ga. App. 863, 866–67, 842 S.E.2d 70, 73–74
(April 15, 2020); Macon-Bibb County. v. Kalaski, 355 Ga. App. 24, 27–28, 842 S.E.2d 331,
334 (April 24, 2020). For further discussion on the Recreational Property Act, see infra.
44 See Christian Henry, Russell A. Local Government Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 70
Mercer L. Rev. 177, 185–86 (2018).
45 344 Ga. App. 488, 811 S.E.2d 19 (2018).
46 302 Ga. 845, 809 S.E.2d 813 (2018).
47 The Georgia Constitution provides:
[A local government officer] may be subject to suit and may be liable for injuries
and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent failure to
perform, [his] ministerial functions and may be liable for injuries and damages
if [he] act[s] with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the
performance of [his] official functions.
Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d).
48 See Henry et. al., Supra note 44, at 185–86 (2018).
49 See Odum v. Harn, 350 Ga. App. 572, 572, 829 S.E.2d 818, 818 (2019), cert. denied
(Jan. 27, 2020).
50 Id., 829 S.E.2d at 818–19.
41
42
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The facts involved a child passenger on a Bryan County School District
school bus driven by the defendant. “The [bus driver] stopped the bus
across the street from the child’s house, activating the [bus’s] red flashing
lights, stop arm, and crossing gate. The child was required to cross a lane
containing oncoming traffic in order to reach his [waiting] mother.” The
school district’s training manual provided that “[s]tudents should not be
allowed off the bus until all traffic has stopped” and that drivers should,
“[t]each the students that [the driver’s] signal for danger after they are
off the bus is blowing the horn.” 51 Drivers were also instructed that they
should “[c]ontinuously use both direct vision and mirrors to identify any
moving traffic from both the front and from behind.” 52
Further, the bus driver had recently attended a training session where
these and other guidelines, including having a child pause on the bottom
step of the bus before disembarking, were reviewed. 53
The bus driver testified that “she looked for traffic as she released the
child but did not see any.” She also testified that while, “the child stopped
before crossing the yellow line in the middle of the road, he did not look
back at the her for permission to cross.” The bus driver then, “sounded
her horn as soon as she saw an oncoming truck.” Sadly however, the truck
struck the child and the child died. 54
In analyzing whether the bus driver was entitled to official immunity,
the court of appeals carefully examined the analysis in Barnett and found
that the bus driver was exercising a discretionary function in supervising
the child because it required judgment as “to whether any vehicles on the
same road were stationary or moving toward the bus such that the child
should or should not be released.” 55
Accordingly, having reviewed the particular facts of the case, the court
of appeals correctly applied Barnett in finding that “the bus driver had to
make multiple judgments about releasing the child.” 56 And because there
was no evidence that the bus driver acted with actual malice, it affirmed
the trial court’s grant of official immunity. 57 There will not be a third bite
at the apple, as the supreme court denied certiorari on January 27, 2020,
after the plaintiffs petitioned a second time. 58

Id. at 573, 829 S.E.2d at 819.
Id.
53 Id. 572–73, 829 S.E.2d at 819.
54 Id. at 573, 829 S.E.2d at 819.
55 Id. at 574–75, 829 S.E.2d at 820.
56 Id. at 575, 829 S.E.2d at 820.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 572, 829 S.E.2d 818.
51
52
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In Williams v. DeKalb County, et al., 59 the Georgia Supreme Court
analyzed official immunity in the context of an alleged violation of the
Open Meetings Act. 60 Specifically, the plaintiff sought penalties against
county commissioners in their individual capacities for purportedly not
providing proper notice under the Act before adopting a pay increase for
themselves. At the motion to dismiss stage, the trial court found that
official immunity protected the commissioners from liability under the
Act because deciding at a meeting to consider an item not on the
pre-published agenda, based on a determination that it is necessary to do
so, requires the exercise of judgment and therefore is a discretionary
act. 61
However, without deciding whether the commissioners’ actions were
in fact discretionary, the supreme court held that even if the actions were
discretionary, the plaintiff “sufficiently allege[d] that the commissioners
acted with actual malice by intentionally violating the agenda
requirements of the Act—a criminal act.” 62 The supreme court therefore
found that the commissioners were not entitled to official immunity from
the penalty provisions of the Act at the pleadings stage. 63
III. TAXATION
This year saw one case dealing with the constitutionality of the 2017
legislative amendment to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(I) 64 and (II) 65, and
how Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) should be valued when
calculating ad valorem real property taxes; one case that interprets the
two 2014 amendments to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, 66 specifically the time in
which a suit for a tax refund can be commenced, and a case concerning
tax executions during tax appeals. Of the three cases discussed herein,
the authors saw two seminal cases interpreting recent legislative
amendments, and one case backing the actions taken by the Fulton
County Tax Commissioner.
In 2016 the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Heron Lake II
Apartments v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, 67 that O.C.G.A.

308 Ga. 265, 840 S.E.2d 423 (2020).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 through 50-14-5 (2020). For further discussion on the Open
Meetings Act, see infra, Section IV(B).
61 Williams, 308 Ga. at 265–66, 840 S.E.2d at 426.
62 Id. at 279, 840 S.E.2d at 434.
63 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 434.
64 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(I) (2020).
65 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II) (2020).
66 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 (2020).
67 299 Ga. 598, 791 S.E2d 77 (2016).
59
60
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§ 48-5-3’s 68 mandate that “[a]ll real property . . . shall be liable to
taxation” and classified LIHTCs as part of, “the bundle of rights, interest,
and benefits connected with the ownership of real estate” in the Georgia
Department of Revenue’s Appraisal Manual, granted preferential
treatment for ad valorem taxation purposes by creating a subclass of
tangible property other than as permitted by the State Constitution,
which ran afoul of the taxation uniformity provision. 69 In 2017, the
General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3). 70 This “amendment
changed the second sentence of paragraph (3) to mandate the
consideration of data provided by the property owner, and added a new
division to (vii) to subparagraph (B),” and subdivided O.C.G.A. §
48-5-2(3)(B)(vii) with two new sections (I) and (II) which in essence state
that tax assessors in establishing the value of any property subject to
rent restrictions under the sales comparison approach or the income
approach. 71 Further, the 2017 amendment rewrote O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-2(3)(B)(vi), which provided the criterion for tax assessors to apply
in determining the fair market value of Section 42 properties. 72 Finally,
the amendment redesignated former O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii) as
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(viii), 73 and that provision provides that, in
determining the fair market value of real property, tax assessors shall
also consider “[a]ny other existing factors provided by law or by rule and
regulation of the commissioner [of revenue] deemed pertinent in arriving
at fair market value.” 74
After the 2017 amendment was passed, the Lowndes County Board of
Tax Assessors (the Board), filed a new declaratory judgment action
seeking a judgement that the 2017 amendment was unconstitutional for
violating the Georgia Constitution's taxation uniformity provision. The
Board asked for the trial court to interpret the 2017 amendment to allow
LIHTCs to continue to be treated as regular income. 75 The trial court held
that LIHTCs could be considered “actual income” under O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II)’s income approach, and if LIHTCs are not
considered “actual income” then O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II) violates

O.C.G.A. § 48-5-3 (2020).
Heron Lake II Apartments, 299 Ga. at 605–06, 610, 791 S.E. 2d at 83, 85.
70 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2020).
71 Heron Lake II Apartments, LP v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga.
816, 818–19, 833 S.E.2d 528, 531 (2019).
72 Id. at 818, 833 S.E.2d at 531.
73 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(viii) (2020).
74 Heron Lake II Apartments, LP, 306 Ga. at 819, 833 S.E.2d at 531.
75 Id.
68
69
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the constitution’s taxation uniformity provision. 76 On appeal, the
Appellants raised three enumerations of error:
(1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Board’s petition because
when the Board filed suit, it had not yet assessed the Appellants’
properties for the 2018 tax year; (2) the trial court erred in finding the
LIHTCs were “actual income” rather than offsets against tax liability;
and (3) the trial court erred in declaring O.C.G.A.§ 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(I)
and (II) unconstitutional, given the General Assembly’s power to
forbid the use of improper appraisal methods. 77

The appellate court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the
Board’s petition for declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act 78 as the Board alleged the existence of a justiciable
controversy in which future conduct depended on the resolution of
uncertain legal relations. 79 Additionally, the court held that the trial
court erred in concluding that Section 42 Tax Credits for LIHTCs
constitute “actual income” under the O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II)
income approach, because the credits offset Section 42 property owners
and investors’ tax liability, and reversed the trial court’s conclusion to
the contrary. 80 Lastly, the court held that O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(I)
and (II) do not violate the Georgia State Constitution’s taxation
uniformity provision as tax assessors have alternative methods of
assessing the fair market value of Section 42 properties and are not
arbitrary or unreasonable methods, and as such, the court reversed the
judgment of the trial court. 81
The issue in Hojeij Branded Foods, LLC v. Clayton County 82 was the
time to bring an action for a tax refund in superior court against a county
or city found in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, and the related waiver of sovereign
immunity. In 2014, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 was amended and added
subsection (g) 83 to the statute. 84 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380(g) states “[u]nder no
circumstances may a suit for refund be commenced more than five years
from the date of the payment of taxes or fees at issue.” 85 Further,
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380(b) states:

Id., 833 S.E.2d at 531–32.
Id. at 819–20, 833 S.E. 2d at 532.
78 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2020).
79 Heron Lake II Apartments, LP, 306 Ga. at 820–21, 833 S.E. 2d at 532.
80 Id. at 823, 833 S.E. 2d at 534.
81 Id. at 828, 833 S.E. 2d at 537.
82 355 Ga. App. 222, 843 S.E.2d 902 (2020).
83 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380(g) (2020).
84Hojeij Branded Foods, LLC, 355 Ga. App. at 225, 843 S.E.2d at 905.
85 Id.
76
77
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[a]ny taxpayer from whom a tax or license fee was collected who
alleges that such tax or license fee was collected illegally or
erroneously may file a claim for refund with the governing authority
of the county or municipality at any time within one year or, in the
case of taxes, three years after the date of the payment of the tax or
license fee to the county or municipality. 86

Before the 2014 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, the statute
required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within three years of the tax
payment and could only file an action in superior court after the
expiration of one year from the date of filing the refund claim or within
one year from the date the governing authority denied the claim for
refund. 87 In this case, the appellate court determined the only deadline
applicable to a taxpayer who directly files suit in the trial court is
subsection (g), which allows for the filing of a suit against a county or
municipality for a tax refund within five years of the date the disputed
taxes were paid because sovereign immunity has been expressly waived
by the Georgia Legislature for the duration of time. 88
In B.C. Grand, LLC v. FIG, LLC et al. 89 the court of appeals looked at
the issue of purchased tax executions for delinquent ad valorem taxes on
property to collect higher interest amounts and penalties than were due
because the executions were based on initial tax assessments that were
later reduced. 90 O.C.G.A. § 48-3-3(b) 91 states “[t]he . . . tax commissioner
shall issue executions for nonpayment of taxes . . . at any time after 30
days have elapsed since giving notice as provided in subsection (c) of this
Code section.” 92 In the case at hand, the Fulton County Tax
Commissioner so issued the 2012 tax executions. 93 Investa Services of
GA, LLC “purchased the tax executions, paying the full face value” in
December 2012, then in September 2013, the Fulton County Tax
Commissioner entered into a consent agreement reducing the assessed
value of the property for 2012 from $7.4 million to $3.8 million, and
issued a refund on the tax overpayment based upon the pertinent refund
statute at that time. In November 2013, Investa Services of Ga, LLC sent
B.C. Grand, LLC a notice stating the 2012 tax executions were due. 94
B.C. Grand filed a class action seeking a refund of any interest and
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380(b) (2019).
Hojeij Branded Foods, LLC, 355 Ga. App. at 226, 843 S.E.2d at 905.
88 Id., 843 S.E.2d at 905–06.
89 352 Ga. App. 646, 835 S.E.2d 676 (2019).
90 Id. at 646, 853 S.E.2d at 677
91 O.C.G.A. § 48-3-3(b) (2019).
92 Id.
93 B.C. Grand, LLC, 352 Ga. App. at 647, 835 S.E.2d at 678.
94 Id. at 647–48, 835 S.E.2d at 678–79.
86
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penalties it claimed to have overpaid to Investa and FIG, LLC as a result
of the tax assessment reduction. 95 The case was dismissed by the trial
court as B.C. Grand failed to state a claim for conversion, negligence,
unjust enrichment or to assert the Fulton County Tax Commissioner
cancelled the tax executions or they were void as a matter of law based
on the post-issuance reduction in the tax assessment. 96 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action for the
aforementioned reasons. 97
IV. OPEN RECORDS/ OPEN MEETINGS
A. Open Records
There is only one case to report on stemming from Georgia’s Open
Records Act 98 this year. In Institute for Justice v. Reilly et al., 99 the
Institute for Justice (a nonprofit public interest law firm, hereinafter
TIFJ) unsuccessfully attempted to challenge the long held principle that
the General Assembly is not an “agency” subject to release of records
under Georgia’s Open Records Act (the Act). 100 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of TIFJ’s claims holding that the
General Assembly and its offices were not subject to the Act where the
statute did not explicitly cover the General Assembly; the historical
practice of the state had been to exempt the General Assembly, and
records from the Office of Legislative Counsel were statutorily exempt
from disclosure. 101
Pertinent facts of the case were as follows: TIFJ requested records
under the Act from several Georgia legislative staff offices about a 2012
statute regulating the practice of music therapy. These offices included
the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate, the House Budget and Research Office, the
Senate Budget and Evaluation Office, the Senate Research Office, and
the Office of Legislative Counsel. When those requests were refused,
TIFJ brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for production
of the requested records. 102
Id. at 648, 835 S.E.2d at 679.
Id. at 649, 853 S.E.2d at 679–80.
97 Id. at 650, 853 S.E.2d at 680.
98 O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 through 50-18-77 (2020).
99 351 Ga. App. 317, 830 S.E.2d 793 (2019). The complaint originally included the
Secretary of State as a defendant, but after a settlement agreement between the Secretary
of State and TIFJ, the claims against the Secretary of State were dismissed.
100 Id. at 317, 830 S.E.2d at 794.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 317–18, 830 S.E.2d at 794–95.
95
96
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TIFJ maintained that “under the plain language of the Act, it applies
to all state ‘offices,’ including the offices of the General Assembly.” 103
However, stating that words are not read in isolation, the court of appeals
disagreed stating that “the primary determinant of a text’s meaning is
its context, which includes the structure and history of the text and the
broader context in which that text was enacted, including statutory and
decisional law that forms the legal background of the written text.” 104
In its current form, the Act provides: “All public records shall be open
for personal inspection and copying, except those which by order of a
court of this state or by law are specifically exempted from disclosure.” 105
As used in the Act, the term “‘[a]gency’ shall have the same meaning as
in Code Section 50-14-1.” 106 That Code section, which is part of the Open
Meetings Act, 107 defines the term “agency” as meaning: “Every state
department, agency, board, bureau, office, commission, public
corporation, and authority.” 108 Reviewing historic case law decided under
older versions of Georgia’s “Sunshine Law” 109 wherein the supreme court
found that nearly identical language did not include the General
Assembly, Coggin v. Davey, 110 and recognizing that in 2012 the General
Assembly undertook a comprehensive revision of both the Open Records
Act and Open Meetings Act but nowhere in that overhaul did the General
Assembly plainly identify itself as now subject to either Act, the court
agreed with the prior precedent stating, “the General Assembly,
including its committees, commissions and offices, is not subject to a law
unless named therein or the intent that it be included be clear and
unmistakable.” 111
The late Judge Goss concurred but wrote separately to emphasize that
longstanding Georgia law required the court to affirm, stating that if the
General Assembly had wanted to include itself in the set of departments,
agencies, or offices subject to the Act, it could have done so expressly. 112
Id. at 319, 830 S.E.2d at 795.
Id. (quoting City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 805 (3), 828 S.E.2d 366 (2019)).
105 Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71(a) (2020)).
106 Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b)(1) (2020)).
107 O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 (2020).
108 Id. (citing O.C.G.A.§ 50-14-1(a)(1)(A)).
109 Id. Following its enactment in 1972, the Sunshine Law was amended several times,
and by 1988, it evolved into the Open Records Act, codified at OCGA §§ 50-18-70 through
50-18-77, and the Open Meetings Act, codified at OCGA §§ 50-14-1 through 50-14-5. See D.
Voyles, Open Meetings: Revise Law, 5 GA. ST. U. L. Rev. 475, 477–78 (1988) (outlining
amendments to Georgia’s Sunshine Law between 1972 and 1988).
110 233 Ga. 407, 410–11, 211 S.E.2d 708 (1975).
111 Institute for Justice, 351 Ga. App. at 320, 830 S.E.2d at 796 (citing Harrison Co. v.
Code Revision Commission, 244 Ga. 325, 328, 260 S.E.2d 30 (1979)).
112 Id. at 322, 830 S.E.2d at 797 (Goss, J., concurring).
103
104
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Chief Judge McFadden dissented, stating the question before the court
was whether the language “every state office” includes legislative offices,
and he believed the answer to be “self-evident” that it in fact did. 113
Supporting his opinion he recognized that in the Act itself the General
Assembly directed that it be broadly construed to allow access to
government records, that the historic case law relied upon by the
majority applied to outdated statutory language (and the statutory
language extending the Act to every state office was not enacted until
2012 which was decades after that case law), and that “the already clear
and unmistakable meaning of every state office encompasses legislative
offices is rendered crystalline by O.C.G.A. § 28-4-3.1” 114 or otherwise that
statute would be reduced to “meaningless surplusage.” 115
TIFJ and others seeking to have the General Assembly be subject to
the Act were disappointed when the supreme court declined to review
this case.
Note: In accordance with Court of Appeals Rule 33.2(a), 116 this opinion
is physical precedent only (citable as persuasive, but not binding,
authority). Although it is outside the scope of this article, it is worth a
look at Rule 33.2 with regard to binding/physical precedent as the rule
changes effective August 1, 2020. 117
B. Open Meetings
Very different aspects of the Open Meetings Act were analyzed by the
court of appeals and Georgia Supreme Court this year. While the court
of appeals’ decision limited the Open Meetings Act and its enforceability,
the Georgia Supreme Court took the opposite approach by allowing
private citizens to bring claims for certain violations.
In Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Lyon, 118 the Georgia Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court’s granting of the Elbert County, the Elbert County
Board of Commissioners, and individual commissioners’ (hereinafter
Elbert County Appellees) motion to dismiss. 119 Sweet City Landfill, LLC
(hereinafter Sweet City) alleged that it spent considerable monies
pursuing a certain landfill project that was the subject of many lawsuits.
In a 2018 public meeting, one of the commissioners referenced a private
meeting in 2012 between the commissioners wherein they discussed

Id., 830 S.E.2d at 797–98.
Id. 322–25, 830 S.E.2d at 797–99.
115 Id. at 325, 830 S.E.2d at 799.
116 GA. CT. APP. R. 33.2(a) (2020).
117 Institute for Justice, 351 Ga. App. at 322, S.E.2d at 797.
118 352 Ga. App. 824, 835 S.E.2d 764 (2020).
119 Id. at 824, 835 S.E.2d at 768–69.
113
114
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knocking out the landfill project before it got started. 120 The Appellees
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that (1) the claim had been resolved in
a prior lawsuit; (2) the statute of limitations for Sweet City’s claim had
expired; and (3) the individual defendants were entitled to immunity. 121
Although the court held in favor of the Elbert County Appellees on all
three issues, 122 this summary will focus on the statute of limitations and
immunity arguments as they relate to the Open Meetings Act.
Because it pled bad faith, Sweet City argued the trial court erred in
granting immunity to the Elbert County Appellees. 123 The relevant
portion of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-20(a) 124 provides:
any local governmental agency, board, authority, or entity shall be
immune from civil liability for any act or any omission to act arising
out of such service if such person was acting in good faith within the
scope of his or her official actions and duties and unless the damage or
injury was caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such
person. 125

Although Sweet City generally pled that the Elbert County Appellees
did not act in good faith, the court held the complaint failed to set out a
statement that the Elbert County Appellees adopted or took a resolution,
rule, regulation ordinance, or any other official action at a closed meeting
in violation of the Open Meetings Act. 126 The important takeaway is that
the court found the alleged actions mentioned above did not rise to the
level of bad faith. 127
Next, Sweet City contended that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 128 tolls the
six-month statute of limitations for an Open Meetings Act lawsuit,
because the Elbert County Appellees’ fraudulent 2012 actions were not
revealed until 2018 (six years later). 129 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 generally tolls
the statute of limitations until the discovery of fraud if there are
allegations of fraud that deterred the plaintiff from bringing the claim. 130
However, the relevant portion of O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)(2) 131 reads as
follows:
Id. at 825, 835 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 825–26, 835 S.E.2d at 769.
122 Id. at 824, 835 S.E.2d at 768.
123 Id. at 827, 835 S.E.2d at 770.
124 O.C.G.A. § 51-1-20(a) (2019).
125 Id.
126 Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 352 Ga. App. at 827–28, 835 S.E.2d at 770.
127 Id. at 828, 835 S.E.2d at 771.
128 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2020).
129 Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 352 Ga. App. at 829, 835 S.E.2d at 771.
130 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96.
131 O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)(2) (2020).
120
121
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Any resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, or other formal action of
an agency . . . based on an alleged violation of this provision shall be
commenced within 90 days of the date such contested action was taken
or, if the meeting was held in a manner not permitted by law, within
90 days from the date the party alleging the violation knew or should
have known about the alleged violation so long as such date is not more
than six months after the date the contested action was taken. 132

The court held the plain meaning of O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)(2) creates a
six-month maximum for filing Open Meetings Act claims and “provides
no indication that the time for bringing such a claim may be tolled.” 133
The Sweet City ruling makes it challenging for plaintiffs to bring Open
Meetings Act claims. Unless the legislators revise the Act, it appears the
six-month limitation period will be strictly enforced. Furthermore, the
court set a high bar for alleging bad faith in such a case to overcome
official immunity.
Moving on to another case during the subject time period involving the
Open Meetings Act. In Williams v. Dekalb County, a resident sued
Dekalb County, Dekalb County’s chief executive officer, and Dekalb
County’s members of the board of commissioners, alleging, amongst other
things, that the board of commissioners (Dekalb Appellees) violated the
Open Meetings Act by not giving proper notice of their intent to adopt an
ordinance that increased their own salaries. According to the complaint,
the Dekalb Appellees properly provided notice to the legal organ of its
intent to raise the salary of the governing authority. However, the
agenda published for the meeting made no reference to the proposed
salary ordinance. During the meeting, the commissioners voted to add
the proposed salary ordinance as a “walk-on” resolution and approved the
increase in salary for commissioners and the chief executive officer. 134
The trial court granted the Dekalb Appellees’ motion to dismiss and
Williams appealed. 135
Although the court previously held that a private citizen does not have
standing to enforce the criminal penalty provision of the Open Meetings
Act, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a private citizen has the
authority to enforce the civil penalty provision. 136 O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5 137
authorizes the Attorney General to enforce the provision “[i]n addition to
any action that may be brought by any person, firm, corporation, or other

Id.
Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 352 Ga. App. at 829, 835 S.E2d at 771.
134 Williams, 308 Ga. at 267–68, 840 S.E.2d at 427.
135 Id. at 268–69, 840 S.E.2d at 427–28.
136 Id. at 276–77, 840 S.E.2d at 433.
137 O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5 (2020).
132
133
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entity.” 138 Thus, the Open Meetings Act clearly envisions a private citizen
bringing a civil penalty claim.
The court next held that the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation
of the Open Meetings Act. 139 Although the Open Meetings Act requires a
county, prior to any meeting, to make available the agenda of all matters
expected to come before the board, “[f]ailure to include on the agenda an
item which becomes necessary to address during the course of a meeting
shall not preclude considering and acting upon such item.” 140 The
complaint clearly alleges the salary ordinance was intentionally omitted
from the agenda and that nothing occurred after the item was omitted
from the agenda that made it necessary to take the matter up at that
particular meeting. 141 Therefore, an Open Meetings Act violation was
sufficiently alleged to survive the motion to dismiss stage. 142
Next, the court held the commissioners were not entitled to official
immunity at the motion to dismiss stage from the penalty provisions of
the Open Meetings Act. 143 The court ruled the complaint sufficiently
alleged the commissioners acted with actual malice by intentionally
violating the agenda requirements of the Open Meetings Act. 144
Lastly, the court briefly explained the Open Meetings Act claims were
not barred by legislative immunity. 145 Quite simply, because the Open
Meetings Act establishes civil and criminal penalties for violations, the
“Act plainly abrogates legislative immunity for local officials.” 146
Unlike Sweet City, this case made it easier for a plaintiff to bring an
Open Meetings Act claim. Time will tell if the confirmation that private
citizens may bring claims for civil penalties under the Open Meetings Act
will result in an increased number of such cases.
V. ZONING AND LAND USE
In Clayton County v. New Image Towing and Recovery, Inc., 147 what
began as a case about the standard of review on appeal of zoning
decisions ended with a treatise on statutory construction. Here, the
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5(a) (2020).
Williams, 308 Ga. at 277, 840 S.E.2d at 434.
140 O.C.G.A. 50-14-1(e)(1).
141 Williams, 308 Ga. at 277, 840 S.E.2d at 433.
142 Id. at 280, 840 S.E.2d at 435.
143 Id. at 279, 840 S.E.2d 434.
144 Id. For official immunity analysis, “actual malice” means a deliberate intention to do
wrong. Wyno v. Lowndes County, 305 Ga. 523, 531, 824 S.E.2d 297, 304 (2019). Stated
differently, the defendant must have intended to cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 203–04, 647 S.E.2d 54, 56 (2007).
145 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 435.
146 Id.
147 351 Ga. App. 340, 830 S.E.2d 805 (2019) (physical precedent only).
138
139
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Clayton County Planning and Zoning Administrator required a business
license applicant to submit a site plan to run a towing and wrecking
business to show how it would comply with parking and development
requirements under the applicable zoning ordinances. The applicant
refused to do this and the County’s review committee suspended the
application. 148 The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) held a hearing and
upheld the Administrator’s decision, finding that the ordinance required
submission of a site plan if the site was going to be “altered” in any way,
over the applicant’s argument that to “alter” the site referred to physical
alterations only. 149 On petition for certiorari to the superior court, the
superior court reversed, strictly construing the ordinance in favor of the
property owner and applying a de novo review of the BZA’s decision on
grounds that the same constituted a matter of law, not a factual
finding. 150
The court of appeals reversed, first reiterating that, while the
standard of review of a County zoning board’s factual findings remains
“substantial evidence/any evidence,” issues of law are reviewed de
novo. 151 Although the court of appeals agreed the trial court’s de novo
review was the correct standard because the BZA’s decision turned on
interpretation of the ordinance, it reversed nonetheless, holding that the
trial court erred by imposing too narrow an interpretation of the term
“alter” contrary to the ordinance’s plain meaning and context. 152
In Riverdale Land Group, LLC v. Clayton County, 153 the court of
appeals distinguished legislative zoning decisions from quasi-judicial
ones, reaffirming that while suit may be brought to seek mandamus relief
for the former, for the latter, the sole avenue for remedy lies in petition
for certiorari to the superior court, and mandamus is not available. 154
The property owner, Riverdale Land Group (RLG), applied for a
conditional use permit to build a gas station, which the Clayton County
(County) Board of Commissioners denied. RLG filed suit, raising
constitutional challenges to the County’s zoning ordinances and
requested mandamus relief in the form of an order requiring the County
to approve its application. On the County’s Motion, the trial court
dismissed, concluding that the decision to deny the application must be

Id at 341, 830 S.E.2d at 807.
Id. at 342, 830 S.E.2d at 808.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 343, 830 S.E.2d at 808–09.
152 Id. at 343–44, 830 S.E.2d at 809.
153 354 Ga. App. 1, 840 S.E.2d 132 (2020).
154 Id. at 3, 840 S.E.2d at 134.
148
149
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reviewed by petition for certiorari because the decision-making process
was judicial in nature. 155
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that (1) the Board decision was
quasi-judicial in nature because it required the Board to make specific
factual findings about the property under certain criteria imposed by the
applicable ordinance and to hold a hearing on evidence of the same, 156
and therefore (2) mandamus was not available as relief. 157 The court of
appeals also addressed RLG’s argument that a zoning board’s ruling on
a conditional use permit application is legislative, rather than judicial in
nature. 158 RLG argued that Georgia’s Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL) 159
defines a “zoning decision” as a final “legislative action.” 160 The court of
appeals disagreed, holding that, because the Georgia Supreme Court
instructs that “substance matters more than form” in determining
whether a zoning decision is administrative/legislative 161 or
quasi-judicial, the decision here remained quasi-judicial despite the
ZPL’s language. 162
In Davis v. Rockdale Art Farm, Inc., 163, the Rockdale County Board of
Commissioners approved a special use permit for development of a
residential creative arts learning center. Property owners some
three-tenths of a mile away filed a petition for certiorari, alleging various
harms including noise, lighting, and increased traffic. The County and
applicant, as respondents, moved to dismiss on grounds that the
petitioners lacked standing to challenge the permit’s approval; the
petitioners argued that the respondents waived the right to contest
standing by failing to raise lack of standing before the Board. The
Superior Court dismissed the petition, finding that, under the Rockdale
ordinance, an objection to standing at the hearing would be premature
and useless, since the applicant could not assess the opposition’s
standing in advance of the presentation at the hearing. It also concluded
that the petitioners had alleged only “generalized impacts and had failed
to claim any unique damage that would not equally affect all landowners
in the vicinity.” 164
Id. at 1–2, 840 S.E.2d at 133.
Id. at 5–6, 840 S.E.2d at 136.
157 Id. at 7, 840 S.E.2d at 136.
158 Id. at 8, 840 S.E.2d at 137.
159 O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 through 36-66-6 (2019).
160 Riverdale Land Group, LLC, 354 Ga. App. at 8, 840 S.E.2d at 137.
161 Id. at 8, 840 S.E.2d at 137. The court of appeals noted that an amendment to a zoning
ordinance would constitute such a legislative decision, to which a constitutional challenge
and the remedy of mandamus could be appropriate.
162 Id.
163 354 Ga. App. 82, 840 S.E.2d 160 (2019).
164 Id. at 82–84, 840 S.E.2d at 161–62.
155
156
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On appeal by the petitioners, the court of appeals affirmed, holding
that a challenge to standing can be waived if not raised before an
administrative body, but only “if that body was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity.” 165 Because the Rockdale ordinance vested wide discretion in
the Board to grant special use exceptions, the court found this decision
to be legislative rather than quasi-judicial, and therefore, the
respondents were not required to raise the issue before the Board. 166 In
addition,
the
court
reiterated
the
two-prong
“substantial-interest-aggrieved citizen” test for standing to challenge a
zoning decision: (1) a person must have a substantial interest in that
decision, and (2) that “interest must be in danger of suffering some
special damage or injury not common to all property owners similarly
situated.” 167 Since the petitioners’ claims of injury were too vaguely
enumerated and they could not show that “other nearby properties would
not also be affected,” they failed to establish standing and dismissal was
appropriate. 168
In Milani v. Irwin, 169 following a procedurally complex route, the court
of appeals reaffirmed that reduction in aesthetic quality of property gives
nearby landowners standing to challenge permit decisions and held that
a County cannot make ad hoc compromise conditions that expressly
conflict with existing zoning ordinances. 170 Following Dekalb County’s
Zoning Board’s grant of a permit to Milani to build a residence in a
subdivision conditioned on preserving trees in the County’s seventy-five
foot stream buffer, Milani began construction, cutting the forbidden trees
in violation of both the permit and County ordinance. The Planning
Director requested Milani submit a tree planting plan to restore the
buffer within fifteen days; but Milani did not do so until a month later,
after the County issued Milani a citation. Milani then applied for another
permit to restore the buffer and construct a seawall. The Director
initially denied the application but later deemed it acceptable. The
Director also told Milani that he needed no permit to construct the
seawall because it was exempt from the permit requirement due to its
low height, but conditioned that on the sea wall not eliminating the
County buffer. Petitioners—non-adjacent neighbors in the subdivision—
appealed the Director’s decision to the Board of Commissioners, which
the Board affirmed. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari in
Id. at 85, 840 S.E.2d at 163.
Id. at 86, 840 S.E.2d at 164.
167 Id. at 88, 840 S.E.2d at 165 (citing The Stuttering Foundation v. Glynn County, 301
Ga. 492, 494, 801 S.E.2d 793, 797 (2017)).
168 Id.
169 354 Ga. App. 218, 840 S.E.2d 700 (2020).
170 Id. at 218, 840 S.E.2d at 702.
165
166
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superior court, challenging both the sufficiency of the replanting plan and
the decision that Milani did not need a permit for the sea wall.
Meanwhile, Milani filed a separate action against the petitioners and the
Board seeking mandamus and declaratory relief, arguing that the
petitioners’ appeal was untimely under the County Code (the Code), that
the petitioners lacked standing, and that the Board lacked authority to
impose the condition on the sea wall. Milani also intervened in the
petition and moved to dismiss on grounds that the petitioners’ appeal to
the Board was untimely and they did not have standing. The superior
court sustained the petition, finding that the Board erred in approving
the tree planting plan in violation of the Code’s requirements. It also
dismissed Milani’s action, concluding that the County’s conditioning
construction on the seawall on not eliminating the County buffer was
lawful. 171
On Milani’s appeal, the court of appeals first held that the Director’s
initial denial of Milani’s second application was provisional and
tentative, and therefore, the petitioners were not bound to file an appeal
within fifteen days as mandated by County ordinance. 172 Next, the court
held that the petitioners were, in fact, aggrieved persons with standing
to appeal to the Board under the County Ordinance, because, although
their properties were not adjacent to Milani’s, they suffered the visual
intrusion of Milani having cut the trees on his lot; and for the same
reasons, the petitioners had standing to file a petition for writ of
certiorari. 173 Milani also argued that the petition should have been
dismissed because the Board failed to follow the requirements of
O.C.G.A. § 5-4-7 174 and file its answer within thirty days of service of the
writ. 175 The court disagreed, because the trial court had discretion to
extend the time for the Board to file an answer. 176 Finally, the court
affirmed the superior court’s decision to sustain the petition because,
although the Board approved Milani’s replanting plan, that plan itself
violated the Code’s technical specifications requiring replacement of
trees of the size Milani removed from the buffer. 177

Id. at 219–21, 840 S.E.2d at 702–04.
Id. at 221–22, 840 S.E.2d at 704.
173 Id. at 223, 840 S.E.2d at 705.
174 O.C.G.A. § 5-4-7 (2020).
175 Milani, 354 Ga. App. at 223–24, 840 S.E.2d at 705.
176 Id. at 224, 840 S.E.2d at 706.
177 Id. at 224–25, 840 S.E.2d at 706.
171
172
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VI. WHISTLEBLOWERS
For cases arising under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA), 178 this
year’s survey period was largely uneventful. There were no decisions
from Georgia’s appellate courts nearly as important as last year’s en banc
decision in Franklin v. Pitts, 179 redefining the standard for analyzing the
adverse employment action element. 180 And the handful of federal
decisions addressing GWA claims were unremarkable. 181 Nonetheless,
the City of Pendergrass’s appeal from a jury verdict awarding more than
$1,000,000 to the whistleblowers who prevailed at trial does warrant
some discussion. 182
Recall that public employees must demonstrate four elements to
establish a prima facie case under the GWA: (1) they were employed by
a “public employer”; (2) they engaged in whistleblower activity; (3) they
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there is a causal
connection between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse
employment action. 183 In City of Pendergrass v. Rintoul, 184 the City
argued that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in its favor
because the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the first element: that the
City was a “public employer” as that term is defined in the GWA. 185 To
appreciate the City’s argument here, a brief review of the legislative
history of the GWA is, perhaps, necessary. 186
Originally enacted in 1993, the GWA did not extend coverage to every
public employer in the state. By its own terms, the statute limited its
reach to only the state’s executive branch, exempting the office of the

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 (2019).
349 Ga. App. 544, 826 S.E.2d 427 (2019).
180 Id., 826 S.E.2d at 430; see Russell A. Britt, et al., Local Government Law, 71 MERCER
L. REV. at 217–18 (discussing this case); cf. Ward-Poag v. Fulton Cty., 351 Ga. App. 325,
830 S.E.2d 799 (2019) (reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment of GWA claim on
judicial estoppel grounds).
181 Cf. Bruno v. Greene Cty. School, 801 F. App’x 681, 683 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting
that plaintiff-appellant abandoned GWA claim on appeal); Anderson v. Sumter County
School Dist., No. 1:19-CV-42 (LAG), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96714 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 2020)
(denying motion for judgment on the pleadings on GWA claim); Cox v. Fulton County School
District, No. 1:19-cv-04520-JPB-RGV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100680 (N.D. Ga. May 22,
2020) (Vinyard, J.) (non-final report and recommendation) (granting in part and denying in
part motion to dismiss GWA claim), adopted in full at Cox v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., No.
1:19-CV-04520-JPB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100679 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 8, 2020) (Boulee, J.).
182 See City of Pendergrass v. Rintoul, 354 Ga. App. 618, 841 S.E.2d 399 (2020).
183 See, e.g., Franklin, 349 Ga. App. at 547, 826 S.E2d at 431 (discussing elements).
184 354 Ga. App. 618, 841 S.E.2d 399 (2020).
185 Id. at 620. 841 S.E.2d at 402–03.
186 Seth Eisenberg, Public Officers and Employees, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV 309 (2007).
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Governor, the judicial branch, and the legislative branch. 187 Although it
was amended in 2005 to extend coverage to all three branches of state
government, 188 the 2005 amendment still did not enlarge the GWA to
reach local governments, which the Supreme Court of Georgia had
already concluded in 2000 did not come within the meaning of “any other
department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other agency of the
state.” 189 Nonetheless, in 2007, the Georgia General Assembly amended
the GWA again, this time aiming to reach local governments—or at least,
to some extent. 190 The GWA now defines “public employer” as:
the executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state; any other
department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other agency of
the state which employs or appoints a public employee or public
employees; or any local or regional governmental entity that receives
any funds from the State of Georgia or any state agency. 191

The last clause in the definition was the key to the City of Pendergrass’s
arguments. A local or regional governmental entity is now covered by the
GWA, but only to the extent it “receives any funds from the State of
Georgia or any state agency.” 192
In City of Pendergrass, the City argued the plaintiffs had not proven
that the City received state funds. 193 Rejecting the City’s arguments, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of its requests for
directed verdict. 194 The plaintiffs had “identified three sources of funds
that the City had received from the State of Georgia.” 195 These funds
included: “LOST receipts; a check for $68 that the city’s municipal court
received from the Georgia Department of Drivers Services (‘DDS’); and
services and grant money provided to the City’s library by the Georgia
Library Public Information Network for Electronic Services (‘PINES’);
and Piedmont Regional Library System (‘PLRS’).” 196 And because there
187 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(2) (1993); see North Georgia Regional Educational Service
Agency v. Weaver, 272 Ga. 289, 290, 527 S.E.2d 864, 865 (2000) (discussing pre-2005
amendments); cf. Eisenberg, supra note 186, at 311.
188 2005 Ga. Laws 899, § 1.
189 North Georgia Regional Educational Service Agency, 272 Ga. at 290–91, 527 S.E.2d
at 865 (holding regional education agency not within meaning of “public employer”
definition).
190 2007 Ga. Laws 298, § 1; cf. Eisenberg, supra note 186, at 319–20 (discussing the 2007
amendment).
191 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(4) (2020).
192 City of Pendergrass, 354 Ga. App. at 622, 841 S.E.2d at 403.
193 Id. at 622, 841 S.E.2d at 403.
194 Id. at 618, 841 S.E.2d at 401.
195 Id. at 623, 841 S.E.2d at 404.
196 Id.
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were conflicts in the evidence as to this issue, the question was
appropriately left for the jury to resolve. 197
Although the City of Pendergrass decision does at least confirm a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the local government entity receives
state funds to be sued under the GWA, the decision’s treatment of the
issue leaves many questions unanswered. For example, did the General
Assembly’s inclusion of local and regional governments—subject to the
qualification that they receive state funds—import some sort of logical or
temporal nexus between the state funds and the whistleblower’s claim
against the local entity? In other words, if neither the public employee’s
disclosure of the alleged, “violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule,
or regulation” 198 or the alleged violation itself has anything to do with
the state funds received, does the GWA still provide a remedy? Moreover,
would a local government’s receipt of state funds in one fiscal year obviate
a whistleblower’s need to make any showing on this for a claim arising
in a subsequent fiscal year in which the local government did not receive
state funds?
The City of Pendergrass Court did not grapple with the General
Assembly’s curious qualification that a local or regional governmental
entity can be sued under the GWA so long as it “receives any funds from
the State of Georgia or any state agency.” 199 Finding that there was some
evidence that the City received state funds, the Court affirmed. 200 Future
cases will be necessary to tease out these unexplored notions.
VII. SERVICE DELIVERY STRATEGIES
In the last year two cases regarding service delivery strategies have
been reviewed by the court of appeals. One was regarding the transfer of
service delivery interests, and the other regarded relief available to a
county for imposed sanctions for their failure to comply with the Service
Delivery Strategy Act (SDS Act) 201 requirements.
In City of Norcross v. Gwinnett County, Georgia, 202 the City of Norcross
(the City) and Gwinnett County (the County) had a dispute “over which
local governmental entity was responsible for repairing and maintaining
a drainage system located on commercial property that was initially
located within the boundaries of the unincorporated County but was later
annexed by the City.” 203 In 1981, the parties that owned the properties
Id. at 624, 841 S.E.2d at 404.
See O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2) (2020).
199 City of Pendergrass, 354 Ga. App. at 622, 841 S.E.2d at 403.
200 Id. at 623, 841 S.E.2d at 404.
201 O.C.G.A. §§ 36-70-2o through 36-70-28 (2019).
202 355 Ga. App. 662, 843 S.E. 2d 31 (2020).
203 Id., 843 S.E. 2d at 32.
197
198
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where the drainage system is located dedicated the system to the County
in a “Dedication of Drainage System and Detention Pond” that was
executed by those parties and the County (the Dedication). 204 In 2005,
the General Assembly amended the Charter of the City to expand the
City limits to encompass portions of the commercial property where the
drainage system was located. 205 In 2012, in accordance with the SDS Act,
the City and the County agreed to a service delivery strategy governing
local services, which in part noted that the County and City agreed to
provide “stormwater services” within their respective boundaries, but did
not contain any conveyance or assignment of the City or the County’s
easements or property interests in the drainage system in the
commercial property. 206 In February of 2018, two large sinkholes formed
in the parking lot of the commercial property due to a damaged pipe that
was part of the drainage system, and a dispute arose between the City
and County regarding who was responsible for the repair and
maintenance. 207 The trial court found that the “City became responsible
for the drainage system when it annexed the commercial property,” and
that Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs 208 did not apply since the
commercial property in this case, “was conveyed to the County by way of
public dedication instead of an easement.” 209
The City appealed the trial court’s ruling, asserting that Fulton
County controls the outcome and should have resulted in the County
being responsible for the maintenance and repair of the commercial
property. 210 The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that
Fulton County is controlling in this case because the County, “like Fulton
County, was expressly granted easements over private property for the
purposes of using, maintaining, repairing, and operating a drainage
system, and the conveyance instrument explicitly stated that the County
would maintain the system.” 211 The court of appeals held that the County
did not argue that the easement in this case was abandoned and failed to
come forward with any evidence to show the easements had been
terminated or legally transferred to the City, and therefore, the County
still retained responsibility for maintaining the drainage system
following the annexation by the City. 212
Id. at 663, 843 S.E. 2d at 33.
Id.
206 Id. at 665, 843 S.E. 2d at 34.
207 Id.
208 295 Ga. 16, 757 S.E. 2d 123 (2014).
209 City of Norcross, 355 Ga. App. at 666–67, 843 S.E. 2d at 35.
210 Id. at 667, 843 S.E. 2d at 35.
211 Id. at 669, 843 S.E. 2d at 36–37.
212 Id. at 672, 843 S.E. 2d at 39.
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In Board of Commissioners of Lowndes County v. Mayor and Council
of the City of Valdosta, et al., the court of appeals reviewed the issue of
whether a county board of commissioners could bring an action against
Department of Community Affairs (DCA) officials in their official and
individual capacities for injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief
after the DCA imposed sanctions on county and cities for their alleged
failure to comply with SDS Act requirements. 213 Lowndes County and the
cities within Lowndes County (the Cities) operated under a service
delivery strategy agreement implemented in 2008. 214 The SDS Act states
that:
[e]ach county and affected municipality shall review, and revise if
necessary, the approved strategy: (1) [i]n conjunction with updates of
the comprehensive plan as required by Article 1 of this chapter; (2)
[w]henever necessary to change service delivery or revenue
distribution arrangements; [or] (3) [w]henever necessary due to
changes in revenue distribution arrangements. 215

In 2016, the chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Lowndes
County sent a letter to the mayors of the Cities giving notice of a meeting
to review the service delivery strategy from 2008, and after the meeting,
a new draft of a 2016 service delivery strategy agreement was prepared
and circulated to the Cities. The Cities and Lowndes County were
instructed to notify the DCA if the review of the new strategy was
completed and that no revisions were necessary or to file a revised service
delivery strategy with DCA in October of 2016. DCA did not receive a
notification or revised service delivery strategy and imposed sanctions
that the County and the Cities would be ineligible for state-administered
financial assistance, grants, loans, or permits until DCA could verify that
Lowndes County and the Cities have complied with the SDS Act. 216
The Board of Commissioners of Lowndes County filed suit against
DCA and the Cities requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, and
mandamus relief against the DCA and the Cities. The Board argued that
the 2008 Strategy Agreement remained in effect and the County and
Cities were still eligible for state-administered financial assistance,
grants, loans, and permits. 217 The court of appeals found that sovereign
immunity was not waived as to the Board’s declaratory and injunctive
relief sought, and therefore was barred from suit. 218 Further, the court of
352 Ga. App. 391, 391, 834 S.E. 2d 890, 891 (2019).
Id. at 392, 834 S.E. 2d at 892.
215 O.C.G.A. § 36-70-28(b)(1)–(3) (2020).
216 Board of Commissioners of Lowndes Cnty, 352 at 392–93, 834 S.E. 2d at 892–93.
217 Id. at 393, 834 S.E.2d at 893.
218 Id. at 396, 834 S.E.2d at 895.
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appeals held that the Board did not have a clear legal right to the relief
sought as to the mandamus relief. 219 The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of the Board of Commissioners of Lowndes
County’s case. 220
VIII.RECREATIONAL PROPERTY ACT
Five times in the survey period, our courts took Georgia’s Recreational
Property Act (“RPA” or the “Act”), 221 out for an appellate spin. First
enacted in 1965, the RPA has the legislatively created stated purpose “to
encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes by limiting owners’ liability toward
persons entering thereon for recreational purposes.” 222 Generally, unless
such an owner of land acts with malice, the RPA insulates it from liability
if no admission fee is charged to the person so entering. 223
In recent past, we have seen opinions significantly defining the RPA
landscape and this round did not disappoint. The courts’ opinions
included revisiting whether the RPA waives counties’ entitlement to
sovereign immunity; 224 examining the definition of “owner of land,”
within the meaning of the Act; 225 and crafting a new, substantial
analytical framework for determining when RPA immunity is available
in mixed-use recreational/commercial cases, requiring a determination of
the true scope and nature of the landowner’s invitation to use its
property. 226 We turn to this last thought first.
A. The New Analytical Framework for Mixed-Use Recreational
Properties
1.
Mercer University v. Stofer
Reversing and remanding the court of appeals’ earlier opinion in
Mercer University v. Stofer, 227 the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision of
the same name significantly alters the legal landscape for determining
Id. at 397, 834 S.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 399, 834 S.E.2d at 896.
221 O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 through 51-3-26 (2020).
222 O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 (2020). The word “landowner” and “owner of land” are used
interchangeably throughout this article and refer to the “owner of land” connotation as set
forth in the statute.
223 O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-22 and 51-22-23 (2020).
224 Gwinnett County v. Ashby, 354 Ga. App. 863, 842 S.E.2d 70 (2020); Macon-Bibb
County v. Kalaski, Ga. App. 355 Ga. App. 24, 842 S.E.2d 331 (2020).
225 Chatham Area Transit Auth. v. Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197, 834 S.E.2d 593 (2019).
226 Mercer University v. Stofer, 306 Ga. 191, 830 S.E.2d 169 (2019); Mercer University
v. Stofer, 354 Ga. App. 458, 841 S.E.2d 224 (2020).
227 345 Ga. App. 116, 812 S.E.2d 146 (2018).
219
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when immunity is available to landowners when the use of the property
includes some aspects of recreational use mixed with some commercial
use. At issue, the opinion presents, is the question of “the meaning of the
phrase ‘invites or permits without charge any person to use the property
for recreational purposes.’” 228 The answer, a test:
[T]he key teachings of our cases can be distilled into a test that is more
connected to the statutory text: the true scope and nature of the
landowner’s invitation to use . . . two related considerations: (1) the
nature of the activity that constitutes the use of the property in which
people have been invited to engage, and (2) the nature of the property
that people have been invited to use. In other words, the first asks
whether the activity in which the public was invited to engage was of
a kind that qualifies as recreational under the Act, and the second asks
whether at the relevant time the property was of a sort that is used
primarily for recreational purposes or primarily for commercial
activity. 229

In crafting this test, the court backpedaled on certain prior mixed-use
case language first introduced in Atlanta Committee for the Olympic
Games v. Hawthorne, 230 an action emanating from the Olympic
bombing. 231 The first casualty was Hawthorne’s having focused on the
landowner’s subjective intent in allowing people onto its land. 232 In
crafting its new test and putting an end to all subjective inquiry into
landowner intent, the court disapproved its prior pronouncement that a
jury is free to consider, “any relevant evidence that may be adduced that
[a landowner’s] purpose in allowing the public free of charge on the locus
delicti was to derive, directly or indirectly, a financial benefit for
pecuniary gain from business interests thereon.” 233
Similarly, the second casualty emanates from this same language,
where the court disapproved of an inquiry into whether the landowner is
set “to derive, directly or indirectly, a financial benefit for pecuniary gain
from business interests thereon.” 234 The court reasoned that indirect

Mercer University, 306 Ga. at 195, 830 S.E.2d at 173.
Id. 306 Ga. at 196, 830 S.E.2d at 173–74. This wrongful death action involved a
woman who fell during a free concert event put on by an alliance created to improve an
inner-city neighborhood. The concert was held at a city-owned park, but Mercer had a
permit for the event on behalf of the alliance. There were food and beverage vendors
present, and sponsorships were available. In a grant proposal, Mercer mentioned the
alliance could see “additional revenue streams.” Id. 306 Ga. at 171, 830 S.E.2d at 192.
230 278 Ga. 116, 598 S.E. 2d 471 (2004).
231 Mercer University, 306 Ga. at 195–96, 830 S.E.2d at 173.
232 Id. at 196, 830 S.E.2d at 173 (citing Hawthorne, 278 Ga. at 117, 598 S.E.2d 474).
233 Id. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 175.
234 Id.
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benefits have, “less connection to the text of the statute” than does the
subjective intent of the landowner. 235
The court also entertained the issue of whether the question of
entitlement to immunity under the Act was a question of law for the trial
court, or one of fact requiring jury resolution. 236 Predictably, and
non-climatically, the court held “[t]he definition and limitation of a
defense is a question of law for the court; the existence or non-existence
of facts on which the defense is predicated is a question for the jury.” 237
This blasé, rote language begets the question of why the court would
grant certiorari in the first place. In this regard, the court itself posited,
“Whether a defendant is entitled to immunity under the Act will
sometimes present a question of fact for a jury, especially in mixed-use
cases.” 238 Adding to the mystery of why the question of law versus
question of fact was even asked, the court’s holding nowhere directly
answers this quoted query, notably reading silent on the “especially in
mixed-use cases” fragment of the inquiry. The closest the opinion comes
to answering was its passive suggestion that a “jury trial may often be
required to resolve the question of immunity under the Act.” 239
The supreme court remanded the case back to the court of appeals to
determine whether Mercer was entitled to summary judgment. 240 The
earlier court of appeals opinion had relied heavily on Hawthorne’s
emphasis on subjectivity and the possibility of direct/indirect benefits
flowing to the University, and the supreme court takes the time to again
point this out in closing its opinion. 241
2.
Mercer University v. Stofer 242
Given the new analytical parameters, the court of appeals predictably
applied the facts set forth in Footnote 229, supra, to the supreme court’s
enunciated test, and found there existed no genuine issue for trial and
that Mercer was indeed entitled to summary judgment. 243
B. Testing the Definition of “Owner of Land”–Chatham Area Transit

Id. at 200–01, 830 S.E.2d at 176.
Id. at 202–03, 830 S.E.2d at 178 .
237 Id. at 202, 830 S.E.2d at 177.
238 Id.
239 Id., 830 S.E.2d at 178.
240 Id. at 203–04, 830 S.E.2d at 178.
241 Id., 803 S.E.2d at 178.
242 354 Ga. App. 458, 821 S.E.2d 244 (2020).
243 354 Ga. App. at 462–63, 821 S.E.2d at 228.
235
236

252

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Authority v. Brantley
Numerous persons were injured when a ramp connected to a floating
dock holding passengers collapsed. The ramp and dock were owned by
the City of Savannah, and along with others, were utilized by the
Chatham County Area Transit Authority (CAT). CAT provided ferry
service across the Savannah river, and the dock in question was where
its passengers embarked and disembarked. The dock was utilized by the
public in several ways, including short term mooring of boats. 244
Dozens of people sued both the City and CAT. Both Defendants moved
for summary judgment on all cases and all motions were denied. 245 The
cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal, where the court of appeals
reversed all denials of the City’s summary judgment motions but
affirmed the denial to CAT. 246 The City’s summary judgment motions
were based on basic sovereign immunity and the RPA, but the court of
appeals decision did not reach the RPA question as to the City, instead
granting it sovereign immunity. 247
The trial court denied CAT’s dispositive motion on the theory there
existed a question of fact as to whether the purpose of the dock was
recreational in nature. 248 The court of appeals, however, turned to the
issue of whether CAT could be considered an “owner” of property under
the RPA, such that it would be entitled to Act’s immunity. The answer?
No. 249
In connection with its purpose of encouraging owners to open their
properties for recreational purposes, the RPA defines an owner as a
“possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, a lessee, an occupant, or a person in
control of the premises.” 250 Not being the actual owner, tenant, or lessee
of the dock, CAT argued it was entitled to RPA immunity because (1) it
occupied the dock several times the day of the accident and (2) it was in
control of the dock at the time because the ferry was docked and CAT had
to control the area to insure safe passage to/from the ferry. 251 The court
made short shrift of these arguments because, on the record, there was
no evidence the ferry was actually docked at the time and no evidence
there was a CAT employee on site when it collapsed. 252 Nor could CAT
244 Chatham Area Transit Authority, 353 Ga. App. at 198, 834 S.E.2d at 596. CAT’s use
of the dock was only temporary, during a time in which its regular dock was under repair.
245 Id. at 198–99, 834 S.E.2d at 597.
246 Id. at 199, 834 S.E.2d at 597.
247 Id. at 205, 834 S.E.2d at 601.
248 Id. at 206, 834 S.E.2d at 601.
249 Id. at 208, 834 S.E.2d at 602–03.
250 O.C.G.A. § 51-3-21(3) (2019).
251 Chatham Area Transit Authority, 353 Ga. App. at 206, 834 S.E.2d at 601–02.
252 Id.
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argue it had an, “exclusive right to occupy the dock on the day of the
collapse.” 253
The court additionally noted that CAT was just like anyone else who
wanted to moor or dock their boats at the dock because CAT neither
maintained nor provided any upkeep on the dock. 254 The court also
rejected a definition of the word “occupant” based on the notion CAT was
“occupying” the spot at the time. 255
C. The RPA does not Create a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for
Counties
Two decisions, same holding. In both Macon-Bibb County v. Kalaski,
and Gwinnett County v. Ashby, the court of appeals confirmed existing
law holding that because the RPA does not specify that its application is
designed to waive a county’s sovereign immunity, that there is no such
waiver. 256 In this regard, the court of appeals in Kalaski rejected the
argument that because a fisherman may have paid a fee to fish off a dock
that sovereign immunity was somehow lost. 257 The court of appeals
reached the same conclusion in Ashby, where an injured parent had paid
admission fee to a football game on county-owned property. 258

Id.
Id. at 207, 834 S.E.2d at 602.
255 Id. at 207–08, 834 S.E.2d at 602.
256 Kalaski, 355 Ga. App. at 28, 842 S.E.2d at 334; Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 866–67, 842
S.E.2d at 73–74.
257Kalaski, 355 Ga. App at 26, 842 S.E.2d at 333.
258 Ashby, 354 Ga. App at 866, 842 S.E.2d at 73.
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